New evidence reveals that Tory Task force Great British Railways Transition Team (GBRTT) remained the main advisor to the Department for Transport on rail reform until March this year, giving extensive input into designing the structure of the new public body.
Official advice reports on ‘GBR Organisational Design’ were submitted to ministers as recently as November and December 2024, influencing the government’s decision to abandon GBR’s longstanding socioeconomic, accessibility and environment duties, and shift to a new ‘streamlined model’.[1]
There is also concerning evidence of corporate capture of parts of GBRTT, with ‘Rail Partners’ (transport owning groups First, Arriva, Transport UK and the Rail Delivery Group) operating deep inside the task force and even co-authoring official policy advice to ministers until at least late 2023. Their involvement continued until this year, including a significant role developing ‘passenger revenue growth strategies’. Though Rail Partners itself was wound down last month, the Rail Delivery Group, run by the very same owning groups, now continues this work.[2]
This report is the first in a series explaining the crisis behind GBR’s organisational design – and the dangers presented by the aggressive lobbying of private companies. The standoff between corporate and public interests is now at peak threat level, and the only way to solve it is the complete repeal of competition law from rail legislation.
GBR Organisational Design – what is the Department for Transport hiding?
GBR Organisational Design means deciding the financial framework for combining the Profit and Loss accounts of the entire railway – over £12 billion per year of taxpayers money. The upcoming Railways Bill will establish this framework and a consultation has just taken place on the legislation. However, the government’s new proposal for GBR was revealed in February to have dropped its longstanding socioeconomic duties for the sake of a new ‘streamlined model’. No cost impact assessment was published with the consultation, and no explanation given for the radical shift in direction.[3]
So, why is GBR’s Organisational Design so controversial that it needs to be hidden from the public? The answer is the railway’s biggest taboo – the restrictions of competition law on the interests of passengers and taxpayers.
Competition Vs Public Interest: Impact on passengers
Competition law conflicts have been the main impediment to rail integration since the 2021 White Paper of the previous government. This continues to be the case because the DfT is trying to reconcile two completely opposing objectives: integrating the railway; and stimulating competition for private companies.
The reason that rail integration and public interest aspects of GBR have repeatedly been found to be impossible is because under competition requirements, GBR is considered a ‘market participant’. This puts it under a complex web of legal duties not to provide additional economic benefits to the public beyond those that can be accessed by private companies.[4] This fundamental constraint still applies, despite the move towards public ownership and the change of government.
The new proposal of a ‘streamlined GBR’ should be seen as a competition-friendly model that leaves room for private companies to fight out the details later. The following ticket retail and cross-sector passenger services are currently under threat:
- Integrated GBR ticket retail platform
Integrated ticket retail is impossible while the government keeps up its objective of ‘stimulating competition in the third-party retail market.’ The previous government dropped this idea entirely because it would have meant the financial separation of its rail and ticket retail arms.
Claims by the government that it will create a ‘government-backed’ app should be treated with scepticism. In fact, the influence of competition law means GBR will have to be designed according to at least some level of internal division between its railway and ticket retail arms. Under the restrictions imposed by the Competition Act 1998, this would mean in the best-case scenario a divided structure unable to integrate fare and ticketing policies or cross-subsidise its operations. In the worst-case scenario, the combination of industry lobbying and competition law restrictions could even open the door to a public-private partnership as GBR’s ticket retail arm.
The loss of integrated ticket retail is now a clear and present danger, with the ‘Independent Rail Retailers’, an entity set up to lobby on GBR third party retail reform, demanding the full separation of GBR’s retail activities, additional controls on cross-subsidy and a stronger role for the Competition and Markets Authority.[5] It is now being widely reported that both the IRR and its biggest member, Trainline, are ramping up their lobbying efforts.
2. Rail Delivery Group dominating ticket retail and rail accessibility
The removal of the Rail Delivery Group was the first priority of the 2021 White Paper on GBR, due to it being named as a major cause of market failure and perverse incentives. In fact, the absorption of the RDG’s cross-sector passenger functions was so much a priority for the previous government that it was the GBRRT’s entire first year workstream. This was suddenly abandoned in June 2022, with no explanation ever given to the public.[6] Meanwhile the Rail Delivery Group has become more powerful than ever and remains in place of the entire country’s ticket retail system and many other ‘cross-sector passenger functions’, including multi-million pound network-wide projects such as ticketless travel and assistance infrastructure for disabled travellers.[7]
Competition-based conflicts are the cause of the RDG remaining lodged in place and make its removal extremely difficult for the government. For example, under the original plan, collaboration between train operators was supposed to be enabled by carefully legislated ‘exemptions’ to competition law. However, the previous government found even the most limited exemptions impossible due the effect of the Competition Act 1998, which tightly controls any collaboration within competitive markets.[8] In the current context, these restrictions impede even the publicly owned operators collaborating even with each other, lest they gain an advantage over private companies.
Furthermore, the responsibility of licensing the third-party ticket retail market cannot lie with either GBR or a hypothetical separated GBR retail arm, since under competition law, this would be seen as risking prejudice towards the interests of passengers and taxpayers, thus disadvantaging third party retailers.[9] Currently, the RDG remains in its licensing role to third parties, meaning it has now become entrenched as both gatekeeper and dominator of the third-party retail market.
3. No public consultation on fare policies or ticket retail
Due to the commercial confidentiality demanded by transport owning groups and the RDG, there has been no consultation on fares or ticket retail policy since 2019, which never reported back to the public. In fact, all cross sector passenger functions have been exempted from consultation throughout many years of rail reform for this reason.[10] Our new evidence proves that the development of fare and ticket growth strategies and policy has been, and continues to be, entirely within the domain of the owning groups and RDG.
With the highest rail fares in Europe, fare and ticketing policies should be considered a priority matter by the DfT. Instead, this issue has been buried for years, and if a competition-based retail model is established, we can expect there to be significant constraints on synchronising fares and ticketing with public policy. Integration will be seen, inherently, as a ‘conflict of interest’ that could discriminate against private companies and therefore creates a ‘chilling effect’ on the new laws and regulation because GBR will have to be carefully designed to avoid legal challenge.
Part Two: Impact on taxpayers
The next part of this series will focus on the impact of competition law and industry lobbying on taxpayers, and will dispatch further evidence warning of the potential outcomes if GBR is allowed to be captured by corporations.
The restrictions of competition law are the biggest obstacle to rail integration and the public/socioeconomic interest. The only solution is the full repeal of all competition clauses from rail legislation, and the removal of the role of the Competition and Markets Authority and competition duties of the Office of Rail and Road.
References
[1] The Rail Minister Lord Peter Hendy has been receiving the same high-level policy advice he had previously signed off on as Chair of Network Rail, while ‘Shadow GBR’, established by the current government in October, has remained barely operational. See Transport Committee, Oral evidence: Shadow Great British Railways, HC 554 and The Times, ‘No minutes from ‘robust’ meetings to create Great British Railways’ (26 Jan 2025).
[2] In addition to its control of the UK’s entire ticket retail system, ‘National Rail’, the Rail Delivery Group is developing and enacting Railway Policy and Strategy, including decarbonisation, stations, network planning, accessibility technologies and workforce reform. (Confirmed via FOI request).
[3] The reports on GBR organisational design were withheld from release by ministerial veto. Other FOI requests show that the DfT is holding back economic and cost modelling it has conducted on the plans, and the Sunday Telegraph recently reported that the DfT has received a report finding that private ‘open access’ operators on the network could cost the taxpayer billions over the next decade.
[4] See Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) response to GBR consultation (April 2025); CMA response to GBR consultation (Aug 2022); ORR response to GBR consultation (July 2022).
[5] Railway Gazette, ‘Rail ticket retailers call for a level playing field’ (8 May 2025).
[6] Confirmed by FOI requests. See also ORR Meeting Minutes, (June 2022).
[7] Despite delivering ‘public functions’ and developing and enacting public policy, RDG is unregulated by the ORR, has no requirement to consult passengers on retail and assistance reform, and is not subject to the Public Sector Equality Duty.
[8] DfT, Plan for Rail consultation outcome (Feb 2024), page 57.
[9] DfT, A railway fit for the future, GBR consultation (Feb 2025), pages 37-38.
[10] ABC, The Great British Cover-Up (July 2022); ABC, The Great British Rip-Off: Why the Williams-Shapps Plan will fail to deliver (Aug 2022).






